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The Justice Cascade:
The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in
Latin America
Ellen Lutz* and Kathryn Sikkink**
I. INTRODUCTION

During the Falldands/Malvinas War of 1982, the British captured Argentine
Navy Captain Alfredo Astiz. Non-governmental human rights organizations accused
Astiz, a notorious figure during Argentina's "dirty war," of involvement in the

disappearance of two French nuns, the arrest and killing of a Swedish girl, and the
interrogation, torture, and disappearance of hundreds of Argentines at the Naval
School of Mechanics in Buenos Aires. After his capture, France and Sweden asked to
question Astiz concerning their nationals, and the British transported him to London
for that purpose. Astiz, availing himself of the protections afforded by the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War, refused to answer. Although there was substantial
evidence against him and the Geneva Conventions do not shield prisoners of war from
prosecution for human rights crimes, neither country sought his extradition, nor did
Britain entertain trying him in the United Kingdom Instead, he was repatriated to
Argentina.
Seventeen years later, the British government arrested Chilean General and
former President Augusto Pinochet on a Spanish extradition warrant for torture and
other human rights crimes. This time, the British courts assiduously considered the
jurisdictional issues posed by the Spanish request and determined that the Spanish
courts had jurisdiction to try Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile over a decade
before. Although British authorities ultimately allowed Pinochet to return to Chile,
finding that he was too incapacitated to stand trial, the events in Europe had
*
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important political repercussions in Chile that are now rippling across Latin America
and the rest of the world. Taking a lesson from Spain, a Netherlands court has
determined that under a theory of universal jurisdiction it can try former Surinamese
military
dictator Desi Bouterse for human rights crimes committed in Suriname in
3
1982.
From a political point of view, it would have been easier to try Astiz in 1982 than
Pinochet in 1999. Astiz was a mid-level naval officer of a country then at war with
Britain. Trying him for human rights violations would have given substance to the
British government's rhetoric about the repressive nature of the Argentine regime.
Pinochet was a former head of state and current senator-for-life of a country that had
supported Great Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War. This Article examines
what changed between 1982 and 1999 that made Pinochet's arrest in Britain possible.
We address two main questions: (1) why, in the last two decades of the 20th century,
was there a major international norms shift towards using foreign or international
judicial processes to hold individuals accountable for human rights crimes; and (2)
what difference have foreign judicial processes made for human rights practices in the
countries whose governments were responsible for those crimes.
A. THE IMPETUS FOR THE 'JUSTICE CASCADE"
We argue that the surge of foreignjudicial proceedings was neither spontaneous,
nor the result of the natural evolution of law in the countries where the trials
occurred. Rather, it was the result of the concerted efforts of small groups of activist
lawyers who pioneered the strategies, developed the legal arguments, often recruited
the plaintiffs and/or witnesses, marshaled the evidence, and persevered through years
of legal challenges. These groups of lawyers resemble an advocacy network, in that they
are interconnected groups of individuals bound together by shared values and
discourse who engage in dense exchanges of information and services.4 The
transnational justice network was atypical, however, because its membership was
confined to a handful of groups of lawyers with appreciable technical expertise in
international and domestic law who systematically pursued the tactic of foreign trials.
In this sense, the transnational justice network resembles what political scientists call
an epistemic community-a network of professionals engaged in a common policy
enterprise with recognized expertise and competence in the particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in that issue or domain. In other
ways, however, the transnational justice network differs from a typical epistemic
community. According to the epistemic community literature, states turn to epistemic
3.
4.
5.

Marlice Simons, Dutch Court Ordersan Investigation of'82 Killings in Suriname,NY Times 12 (Nov 26,2000).
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in InternationalPolitics 2
(Cornel 1998).
Peter Haas, Introduction:Epistemic Communities and InternationalPolicy Coordination46 Intl Org 1 (1992).
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communities in situations of complexity and uncertainty for information to help them
understand the situation and their interests. But states did not turn to the
transnational justice network for expertise in a situation of complexity. Instead, the
transnational justice network independently pursued justice for human rights
violations often in the face of governmental indifference or recalcitrance. The
transnational justice network thus blends characteristics of advocacy networks and
epistemic communities. Like advocacy networks, it is motivated by shared principled
ideas. Like epistemic communities, it is a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence, and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge.
The transnational justice network did not operate in a vacuum. It was part of a
broader human rights advocacy network working in the context of a broad shift in
international norms towards greater protection for human rights. 6 At times, key
members of the transnational justice network were simultaneously leaders in the
broader human rights network.
In a previous article we explored what prompted Latin American states to shed
dictatorial regimes that routinely engaged in serious human rights abuses and replace
them with elected regimes that for the most part comply with fundamental
international human rights norms. We concluded that this transformation was best
explained by a broad norms shift between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s that led to
increased regional consensus concerning an interconnected bundle of human rights
norms, including the norms against torture and disappearance and the norm for
democratic governance. The popular, political, and legal support and legitimacy these
norms now possess is reinforced by diverse legal and nonlegal practices fashioned to
implement and ensure compliance with them. We found this transformation to be
consistent with what legal scholars at the University of Chicago, describing rapid,
dramatic shifts in the legitimacy of norms and action on behalf of those norms, call a
"norms cascade. 7
There are not yet precise definitions or standard ways of showing the operation
of a norms cascade.' Because most of the work on norms cascades has been done by
legal theorists interested in domestic norms, there have not been efforts to model what

6.

See Ellen I Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalHuman Rights Law and Practiem Latin Amrena, 54 Intl
Org 633,654-57(2000).

7.
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902-04(1998).
8.

See Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justiceat 32-69 (cited in note 7); Picker, 64 U Chi L Rev 1225 (cited
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an international norms cascade would look like. We suggest that norms cascades are
collections of norm-affirming events. These events are discursive-they are verbal or
written statements asserting the norm. We are careful to define a norms cascade as
something different from changes in actual behavior, because we are interested in
exploring the impact that norms have on behavioral change.
In Latin America during the last two decades of the 20th century there was a
rapid shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of human rights norms and an increase
in international and regional action to effect compliance with those norms. The
justice cascade" has occurred in the context of that larger human rights norms
cascade. This phenomenon can be likened to the aftershock of an earthquake. While
its genesis is the larger norms transformation, its independent impact is significant
and produces its own set of consequences. Moreover, those consequences are not
limited to Latin America. They are reverberating internationally and contributing to a
transformation in international norms reflected in the creation of such new
international bodies as the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), and changing
popular and political expectations regarding the treatment of perpetrators of human
rights abuses in other parts of the globe, including greater judicial acceptance of the
principle of universal jurisdiction.
The justice norms cascade is being operationalized through a series of normaffirming events including the decisions of foreign courts to try cases involving
violations of international human rights, the active participation of non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") and governments in the process of establishing the ICC, and
the willingness of states to ratify the ICC treaty. Even cases like Pinocbet, in which a
foreign court recognized the legitimacy of a third country's jurisdiction but ultimately
did not take steps to ensure the trial of the perpetrator, can be seen as norm-affirming
events.
B. How FOREIGNJUDICIAL PROCESSES HAVE IMPACTED HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA

The transnational justice network operates by enabling individuals whose access
to justice is blocked in their home country to go outside their state and seek justice

abroad. This dynamic is similar to the primary mechanism of other transnational
advocacy networks. Foreign court rulings against rights-abusing defendants have the
effect of putting pressure "from above" on the state where the rights abuses occurred.
Increasingly, this pressure serves to open previously blocked domestic avenues for
pursuing justice. Looking at other advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink have called
this dynamic a "boomerang pattern"-domestic activists bypass their states and
directly search out international allies to bring outside pressure on their states Thus,
9. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders at 12 (cited in note 4).
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to understand the domestic impact of transnational justice network activity, we must
look at the interaction of both domestic and international judicial and political
processes. Pinocbet is a model for this type of complex interaction. For domestic
political reasons, almost all human rights trials were blocked in Chile prior to
Pinochet's arrest in Great Britain. But the decision of the British House of Lords that
Spain had jurisdiction to try him for human rights abuses had the effect of opening
judicial space for the human rights trials now underway in Chile.
Such boomerangs have not worked in all the cases we explore in this Article. The
domestic impact of foreign judicial processes has depended on other factors as wellspecifically in the amount of publicity those processes received, the parallel
development of more general international human rights law, the receptiveness of
domestic legal and political systems in the target states, and a change over time in
regional attitudes with respect to human rights. In order to document these
conclusions, we turn to a chronological description of key foreign human rights cases,
and examine their evolution and impact. First, we briefly contrast our theoretical
approach with alternative theoretical explanations.
II. ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLAIN THE EMERGENCE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AJUSTICE NORMS CASCADE'

The approach adopted here is an "ideational" approach to the emergence and
effectiveness of justice norms. An ideational approach suggests that the origins of
many international norms lie not solely in preexisting state or societal interests but in

strongly held principled ideas (ideas about right and wrong). These ideas are
fundamental for shaping a state's perceptions both of its interests and its identity,
which in turn determine state policies. Ideational theorists view the international
system as a society made up not only of states, but also of non-state actors that may
have transnational identities and overlapping loyalties. In such a society, states change
their behavior not only because of the economic costs of sanctions, but because of
changing models of appropriate and legitimate statehood, and because the political
pressures of other states and non-state actors affect their understanding of their
identity and their standing in an international community of states. International law
and international organizations are the primary vehicles for expressing community
norms and for conferring collective legitimation. Human rights norms are particularly
important because a good human rights performance signals to other members of the
society that the state belongs to the community of democratic states." In the language

10. This section draws on some ideas from a forthcoming review article by Hans Peter Sdmitz and Kathryn
Siklk Human Rigbts and International Relations Theory, in Waker Carlsneas, Thomas Risse, and Beth
Simmons, eds, Handbook ofInternational Relations (forthcoming Sage 2002).
11. This is the approach in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sildkink. eds, T: PFctrof Human
Rights InternationalNorms and Domestic Change (Cambridge 1999); Kathryn Silddrnk, 71t Pat'ercf Prir.ip.d
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of international relations theory, human rights practices have become "constitutive" of
the identity of a democratic state.
The ideational perspective assumes that the institutionalization of human rights
norms independently influences state actors to comply with them. In this sense it
resembles the "managerial" approach to norm compliance discussed by such legal
theorists as Thomas Franck and Abram and Antonia Chayes1 We maintain that
state actors are drawn towards the rhetorical acceptance of human rights norms not
only by virtue of their intrinsic appeal, or as the result of discussion and jawboning at
international conferences, but also because active human rights pressures and
sanctions by state and non-state actors contribute to processes of socialization and
emulation. Ideational theorists are still grappling to satisfactorily explain which norms
are most likely to be intrinsically appealing to states, and under what conditions are
they likely to have an influence. This Article continues to explore these issues.
The main alternatives to the ideational approach are the realist approach
associated with the work of Stephen Krasner, and a "republican liberal" approach put
forward by Andrew Moravcsik." Realists argue that international norms emerge and
gain acceptance when they are embraced and espoused by the hegemon.14 Conversely,
realists argue that powerful hegemonic states can block any progress on human rights.
This theory has some initial plausibility for explaining the justice cascade when we
consider that the earliest foreign human rights trials began in US courts. But it does
not explain why the US cases have been less effective, while the cases in Spain (clearly
not a hegemon) have been much more effective. Nor does this approach explain why
certain human rights initiatives proceeded when hegemons were followers, not leaders,
or when hegemons actively opposed them. Consistent with the realist approach, US
leadership was important for setting up the international tribunals for Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia. But the process of establishing the ICC treaty is going ahead in
the face of active US opposition. Finally, realist theorists do not provide a convincing
explanation for why and when hegemonic states are willing to begin pursuing human

Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane,
eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 139-72 (Cornell 1993); Keck and
Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (cited in note 4).

12. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in InternationalLaw and Institutions (Clarendon 1995); Thomas M. Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am J Intl L 46 (1992); Abram Chayes and Antonia

Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with InternationalRegulatory Agreements (Harvard 1995).
For a survey of approaches, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 Yale LJ
2599 (1997).
13. These three approaches are also discussed by Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Intl Org 217, 225-26 (2000).
14. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes and Human Rights, in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer, eds, Regime
Theory and International Relations 139-167 (Oxford 1993); John G. Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan,
Socialization andHegemonic Power,44 Intl Org 283-315 (1990).
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rights norms, when they did not do so before. What triggered US court willingness to
consider international human rights cases in the 1980s and 1990s? Why was Britain
willing to find Pinochet extraditable to stand trial for human rights crimes in 1998,
but not willing to take action with respect to Astiz in 1982.
When liberal theory is used to explain the adoption of human rights norms,
regime type is a crucial factor. Moravcsik argues that states accept binding human
rights treaties mainly as a means of political survival-for example, newly
democratizing states are most likely to ratify legal human rights instruments to
protect still unstable democratic regimes from opponents who might attempt to
overthrow them. He provides convincing evidence from Europe that the earliest
supporters of binding human rights treaties were newly democratizing states, while
the more well-established democracies initially failed to support the treaties, or even
worked to weaken them. Hence, Moravcsik argues, the emergence and evolution of
human rights institutions is mainly a function of newly democratic governments
perceptions of domestic threat, rather than the result of outward-projected activities
by the established and most powerful democracies in the international system. Where
realists emphasize coercion, liberals claim voluntary, self-interested, and rational
behavior of state actors in accepting long-term limits to sovereignty.
Evidence from the Americas does not dearly confirm the liberal or realist
theories. In the Americas, established democracies (except for the United States) have
supported regional and global human rights systems from the start." But after the
regional wave of re-democratization between 1978 and 1991, the newly democratizing
countries rapidly ratified international and regional human rights treaties. We do not
know with certainty what motivated them. Along the lines of liberal theory suggested
by Moravcsik, it is likely that part of the motivation was the need to protect their
democracies against the danger of being overthrown. However, these ratifications
were also intended to signal the countries' newly reestablished democratic identity and
their reentry into the community of democratic states. In some cases domestic policy
makers who believed in the human rights ideals were the driving force behind the
ratifications. Thus, the record provides evidence for both liberal and ideational
perspectives. Realism also is relevant to the Americas. US foreign policy was
extremely active in promoting its own vision of human rights and democracy
throughout the region. Though that policy was often contradictory and inconsistent,
the United States has exercised active hegemonic leadership with regard to human
rights in the region.

15. Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, and Canada ratified early the Optional Protocol to the Internaional
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and Costa Rica and Venezuela were the first two countries to
accept compulsoryjurisdiction of the Inrer-American Court
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III. EVENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE JUSTICE CASCADE
A. THE US CASES

The practice of "borrowing" foreign judicial systems to seek justice for past
human rights abuses began in the United States in 1979 with the path-breaking
Filartiga v Pena-Irala,' and the family of cases that followed. The US cases differed
from the later Spanish cases in that they were civil instead of criminal, and they
required as a basis for jurisdiction that the defendant be physically present in the
United States. An interconnected group of lawyers pursued these cases, each learning
from and building upon previous efforts.
Since the mid 1970s, human rights NGOs in Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and
elsewhere, to the extent their governments allowed them to operate at all, dedicated
themselves to protesting and documenting human rights violations and ensuring that
the evidence they uncovered was protected. This served multiple functions. It served
as a clearinghouse of information that domestic attorneys could use when demanding
information about the whereabouts of a disappeared person or seeking the release of a
political prisoner. It preserved a record that could one day be used to hold
perpetrators accountable and ensure that history was accurately recorded. Finally, it
aided international human rights groups by providing accurate evidence of violations
that they could use when appealing to other governments and inter-governmental
organizations to exert pressure to stop the violations. Latin American human rights
advocates actively cooperated with international human rights organizations to ensure
that governments and international organizations used the provided information for
this purpose.
As awareness of human rights violations in Latin America filtered north, human
rights lawyers in the United States sought ways to help heighten pressure on Latin
American governments. A creative group of lawyers at the New York-based Center
for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") uncovered a little used jurisdictional statute called
the "Alien Tort Claims Act" which provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."" In 1979, these lawyers got their first
opportunity to test whether this jurisdictional basis could be used to sue a foreigner in
a US court for money damages for violations of human rights that occurred abroad.
The plaintiffs, Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly, filed suit in federal district
court for the torture and murder of their seventeen-year-old son and brother Joelito.
The defendant, Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala, was the former Police Inspector of
Asunci6n, then illegally residing in New York. The Filartigas alleged that he
kidnapped and killed Joelito to pressure Dr. Filartiga to end his political activities.
16. Filartigav. Peha-Irala,630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
17. 28 USC § 1350 (1994) (originally drafted in 1789).
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Filartigabroke new ground. It
declared that torturers, like pirates and slave traders before them, were "enemies of all
mankind" who could be tried wherever they were found.' After the Second Circuit
rendered its ruling in 1980, Pefia-Irala was deported and defaulted. The district court
awarded the Filartigas $10 million in compensatory and punitive damages to "make
clear the depth of the international revulsion against torture" and in the hope that it
would deter other would-be torturers from engaging in similar conduct-'9
The success of Filartigaprovided US human rights lawyers with a new avenue for
striking back at perpetrators of human rights abuses and the means to offer some
satisfaction to individuals who had suffered. A network of US lawyers mobilized to
take on these cases and before long the nuances of the legal theories first raised in
Filartigawere being tested in the courts. Many of the lawsuits involved victims and
perpetrators of human rights abuses from Latin America. The cases we discuss here
are representative of this trend.
In January 1987, human rights advocates discovered Carlos Guillermo SuarezMason, former Commander of Argentina's First Army Corps, living clandestinely
outside of San Francisco, California. The First Army Corps had jurisdiction over the
city and province of Buenos Aires and was purported to be responsible for as many as
half of all disappearances, deaths, torture, and prolonged arbitrary detentions during
Argentina's dirty war during the mid- to late-1970s. Immediately three overlapping
teams of lawyers, including lawyers working on behalf of CCR, Americas Warch, and
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, filed suit in US federal
court in San Francisco. Their clients were half a dozen Argentine victims who were
tortured, imprisoned, or disappeared during Suarez-Mason's rule. Although three
separate lawsuits were filed, the pro bono lawyers coordinated their litigation
strategies (one lawyer, Juan Mendez, the Executive Director of Americas Watch, was

part of the legal team in each of the three cases) and default judgments were entered
against Suarez-Mason in all three suits.2 One case set an important legal precedent.
until that time, federal courts had been willing to find defendants liable for torture
and murder, but were reluctant to find that "disappearances" were "torts ... in
violation of the law of nations:' In a moving self-reversal, District Judge Jensen
concluded in Forti v Suarez-Mason that there existed a "universal and obligatory
international proscription of the tort of 'causing disappearance.f" Like Pefia-Irala,
18. Filartiga,630 F2d at 890 (cited in note 16).
19. Fifartigav Peia-Irala,577 F Supp 860, 866 (E D NY 1984).
20. Forti v Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp 1531 (N D Cal 1987); Martinez Bra v Suarez-Massn, No C-87-2057 (N
D Cal April 22.1988); de Rapaportv Suarez-Mason, No C-87-2266 (N D Cal April 11, 1989).
21. Forti v Suarez-Mason, 694 F Supp 707, 711 (N D Cal 1988). The Court ruled that this tort had two
essential elements: '(1) abduction by state officials or their agents; followed by (2) official refusals to
acknowledge the abduction or to disclose the detainees face." Id.
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Suarez-Mason, after failing to defeat the court's jurisdiction, refused to defend himself
in the US civil litigation. Each of the plaintiffs received a six-figure default judgment
that included compensatory and punitive damages.
In June 1991, nine Guatemalans and one US citizen filed suit in the US district
court in Boston against former Guatemalan Minister of Defense General Hector
Gramajo. Gramajo was served with process while attending his commencement from
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This case was
spearheaded by the CCR in cooperation with the Lowenstein International Human
Rights Clinic at Yale Law School and El Rescate Legal Services in Los Angeles. The
plaintiffs, Kanjobal Indians and a missionary who worked with them, alleged they
were forced to flee Guatemala as a direct result of abuses inflicted upon them or their
families by Guatemalan military forces who ransacked their villages and brutalized
them. Some of the plaintiffs were subjected to torture and arbitrary detention. Others

were forced to watch as family members were tortured to death or summarily
executed. One plaintiffs father disappeared. The plaintiffs maintained that in his roles
as Vice Chief of Staff and Director of the Army General Staff, commander of the
military zone in which the plaintiffs resided, and Minister of Defense, Gramajo was
personally responsible for ordering and directing the implementation of the program
of persecution that caused their suffering. Gramajo refused to defend himself and
voluntarily returned to Guatemala. A default judgment of $47.5 million was entered
against him in 1995.
B. THE EUROPEAN CASES

Latin American human rights advocates also collaborated with their
counterparts in Europe to apply outside pressure on their governments to bring rights
violators to justice. In Europe they did this, not by filing civil lawsuits, but by pushing
European courts to criminally try, in Europe, alleged perpetrators of rights violations
that took place in Latin America. This was possible for two reasons. First, many

European countries, unlike the United States, recognize the passive personality basis
for criminal jurisdiction in which a state may exercise criminal jurisdiction over
anyone who injures one of their nationals, no matter where the crime occurred.
Second, the Southern Cone countries were populated by Spaniards, Italians, and
others of European descent, and many of these European countries recognize as
nationals their children and even subsequent generations. As a result, transnational
justice network lawyers were able to convince European judges that they had
jurisdiction to criminally try Latin American perpetrators of rights abuses for the
torture, disappearance, or murder of their nationals.
The most prominent early case of this type involved Alfredo Astiz, alleged to be
responsible for the torture and presumed murder in Argentina of two French nuns,
Alice Domon and Leonie Duguet, among other crimes. Their lawyers, supported by
human rights advocates that were part of the transnational justice network, pressed a

c(V.
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French court to take up his case. In March 1990, that court tried Astiz in absentia for
these crimes, found him guilty, and sentenced him to life in prison. This, apparently,
was the first time a French court had convicted a foreigner in absentia for crimes
committed against its citizens on foreign soil. France then asked Argentina to
extradite Astiz. Consistent with its legal position that Astiz was protected from trial
for the nuns' deaths by the Punto Finalmeasure,' and by its across the board refusal to
submit its citizens to stand trial abroad for crimes committed in Argentina, Argentina
refused. But by doing so, Argentina jeopardized its relations with France. France
objected, in 1995, when the Argentine Naval Command announced that Astiz was to
receive a promotion, and that promotion was stopped. In 1996, before Argentine
President Carlos Menem went to France to present Argentina's credentials to join the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Astiz was removed from
active duty with the Argentine Navy.'
In 1998, the normally press-averse Astiz, who though "retired" from the Navy
remained under military discipline and enjoyed full privileges including a pension,
access to health care, and the right to wear a uniform, gave an interview to Tres Puntos,
an Argentine periodical. 4 In the interview he described his actions in kidnapping
during the dirty war and boasted that he did his duty and felt no remorse. He also
bragged that the Navy was protecting him and ensuring his comfortable retirement,
and he threatened journalists who wanted to know more about the fate of the
disappeared that he and his former colleagues were "trained to kill." Responding
immediately, the naval command placed him under a sixty day arrest;, when President
Menem proclaimed that he had brought the Navy into disrepute, Astiz was sacked.
He also was criminally charged for offenses includingjustifying crime, attacking the
constitutional order, and threatening behavior, though after a trial in early 2000 he
was sentenced to a mere three month suspended sentence.
France was not the only European country interested in trying Astiz. Sweden
sought him for the murder of one of its nationals, Dagmar Hagelin, a teenager who
was arrested and murdered in Buenos Aires, probably as a result of mistaken identity,
and put out an international warrant for his arrest. Spain also sought his arrest.
Astiz's case was included in an orchestrated effort by Argentine exiles living in
Spain to convince a Spanish court to file criminal complaints against Argentine
military junta leaders for human rights crimes in Argentina betveen 1976 and 1983.
On March 28, 1996, an association of Spanish prosecutors (Uni6n Progresista de
22. The Punto FinalLaw, adopted by the Argentine legislature in late 1986, set a sixty day limir on the filing of
new criminal complaints against anyone for crimes committed during Argentina's dictatorship. Americas
Watch, Truth andPartialJustice in Argentinax An Update 48 (April 1991).
23. Menean bids on OECD Status,Latin America Regional Reports Southern Cone (March 14,1996).
24. Gabriela Cerruti, Interview with Afredo Astiz, Tres Puntos (Marko Miletih, trans), reprinted in Harffs 25
(April 1998); Astiz speaks out of turn about killings, Menem sacks cifcer ftr darra-rng rav"s or.aZ:, Latin
American Regional Reports: Southern Cone Report (Feb 3,1998).
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Fiscales) formally triggered proceedings before Spain's "National Audience"
Investigatory Court for alleged crimes against humanity including genocide and
terrorism. Izquierda Unida, the third largest political party in Spain, working with
SERPAJ, the Argentine human rights NGO headed by Nobel laureate Adolfo Perez
Esquivel, filed a subsequent private criminal action (acci6n popular). On June 28, 1996,
Judge Baltazar Garz6n asserted that his court had jurisdiction to investigate the
Argentine case.25
Around the same time, Chilean exiles in Spain adopted a similar strategy and
filed the first of two cases against the Chilean military junta. That case similarly was
succeeded by a private criminal action by private groups and individuals including the
Salvador Allende Foundation, the Uni6n Progresista de Fiscales, and a number of
Chilean citizens. On July 25, 1996, Judge Manuel Garcia Castellon accepted
jurisdiction over the Chilean case and began an investigation.2
In October 1998, upon learning that Pinochet was in England, the Uni6n
Progresista de Fiscales asked Judge Garz6n to request the opportunity to interrogate
Pinochet about his role in "Operation Condor," a multinational intelligence network
that operated in the Southern Cone in the 1970s that was implicated in the
disappearance and killing of Argentine dissidents. When the United Kingdom refused
to allow the interrogation without an arrest warrant, Judge Garz6n formally requested
Pinochet's extradition to Spain. Around the same time, the Agrupaci6n de Familiaresde
Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Chile (Chilean Group of Relatives of Detained and
Disappeared People) requested that Pinochet and other junta members be charged
with genocide, terrorism, and torture. With Pinochet as the nexus, the Spanish
judicial system consolidated the Argentine and Chilean cases before Judge Garz6n,
whose case was the former in time. On October 30, the National Audience affirmed
Spain's jurisdiction over the Argentine and Chilean cases and, on November 3, Judge
Garz6n issued a request of extradition against Pinochet. Garz6n's 285-page
indictment against Pinochet was issued on December 10, 1998. In it he charged
Pinochet with genocide for designing and implementing a plan, coordinated down to
the smallest detail, to eliminate a sector of the Chilean population. He also charged
Pinochet with terrorism and torture.f

25.

F. Javier Leon Diaz, 'The 'Pinocbet Case,' From the Spanish Perspective (on file with authors); Richard J.
Wilson, Spanish Criminal Prosecutions Use International Human Rights Law to Battle Impunity in Chile and
Argentina, available online at <hrtp://www.Derechos.org/koaga/iii/5/wlson.htm pinochet+cxtradidon>
(visited Mar 25, 2001), originally published in ACLU Ind Civ Lib Rep (Jan 1997).

26. Id.
27. Id.
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C. TRANSNATIONALJUSTICE NETWORK STEPS TO STRENGTHEN THE
PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALJURISDICTION

The transnational justice network did not limit its work to bringing cases in
foreign courts. It also was pro-active in pushing for changes in international law that
would strengthen its capacity to bring cases. Jurisdiction in the US civil cases
discussed above was founded not on a treaty but on customary international law and
narrow US jurisdictional statutes. But by accepting jurisdiction, the US courts
effectively declared that states had at least a permissive right to assert universal
jurisdiction over human rights crimes that violated customary international law.
While reliance on the universality principle ofjurisdiction had been used in the past
for such acts as piracy, slave trading, and violence against ambassadors, Filartiga(albeit
a civil lawsuit) was the first case to apply the principle in a non-wartime human rights
case.
Prior to the late 1970s, international norms proscribing the most heinous war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide were well established as a matter of
customary international law and were embedded in widely ratified treaties. These
treaties underscored both the criminality of these acts and the legal principle that
persons alleged to have committed these crimes, by virtue of the fact that they are
crimes against the international community, can be tried by any state whenever the
alleged offender is found within that state's territory.2s Factors such as where the acts
occurred, the identity of the victims, or the extent of contacts with the forum state are
not barriers to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
As a matter of practice, universal jurisdiction was rarely relied on as a basis for
trying persons accused of heinous human rights crimes. Countries that tried persons
accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity usually had more traditional bases
for asserting jurisdiction to do so: the acts occurred on that state's territory (territorial
basis for jurisdiction); the defendant was a national of the trying state (the nationality
principle ofjurisdiction); or the victim was a national of the trying state (the passive
personality principle of jurisdiction).!' The most prominent exceptions were the
Nuremberg Trials after World War II and the Adolf Eichmann trial in Israel, in

28. Consider the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 78 UNTS 277
Art 6 (1948). Note that Article 6 of the Genocide Convention provides that 'persons charged with
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction" but commentators and courts have interpreted this provision as one that does nor exclude the
universal basis ofjurisdiction, at least on a permissive basis. See Rodley, r: Treatmt of Prirnsat 102
(cited in note 2).
29. Seegenerally JordanJa.Paus, er AlInternationalCriminal an- Cases and Materias 95-107 (Carolina 1996).
30. Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 F2d 571,581-83(6th Cir 1985).
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which, in addition to the universal basis of jurisdiction, the Israeli court relied on a
uniquely Israeli basis for jurisdiction: crimes against the Jewish people."
By the late 1970s, the principal international human rights treaties, including the
ICCPR, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights were in force. These treaties prohibited conduct such as summary
execution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged arbitrary detention, and so forth, and required ratifying states to take
measures to ensure that victims of such acts had enforceable remedies. But they did
not specify the criminal elements of these acts nor did they require states to try
persons alleged to be responsible for them. The transnational justice network, led by
lawyers working under the auspices of Amnesty International, many of whom also
were involved in the human rights lawsuits described above, pushed hard for the
adoption of additional international treaties that would define, criminalize, and clarify
the full scope of states' obligations with respect to violations of many of the rights
protected generally under these treaties. They won early support from key European
governments that collaborated with the NGOs to press for their adoption, and
lobbied other states to support provisions binding ratifying states to treat such
conduct as criminal.
In the most pronounced example, during the drafting the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the transnational justice network and its government supporters pushed
hard to ensure that the treaty required states to criminalize torture and establish
jurisdiction to try torturers, not only under traditional bases of jurisdiction, but also
under the universality principle of jurisdiction. The latter proved to be one of the
most controversial proposals before the working group assigned by the United
Nations Human Rights Commission to prepare the treaty, and it was not until the
working group's final session in 1984 that the matter was resolved.
The transnational justice network prevailed and the text of the treaty, which was
adopted by the General Assembly in December 1984, provides, "Each State Party
shall [... ] take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
such offenses in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its
jurisdiction and it does not extradite him."3 2 The Organization of American States
("OAS") took this same approach to universal jurisdiction the following year when it
adopted the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. The
subsequent wide ratification of these treaties contributed to fortifying the means for
states to try or extradite individuals responsible for torture or similar heinous crimes.

31. Hannah Arendt, Eicbmann in Jerusalem:A Report on the Banalityof Evil 5 (Penguin rev and enlgd ed 1994).
32. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 24
ILM 535, Art 5 para 2 (1985).
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The turning point for application of the universality principle of jurisdiction
came in Pinocbetwhen Judge Garz6n asserted Spain's competence to try Pinochet on
the principle of universal jurisdiction for certain international crimes recognized under
Spanish law. Because of the double criminality rule," and the fact that British law
does not give British courts as broad a jurisdiction over international crimes as
Spanish law affords Spanish courts, the House of Lords was unwilling to extradite
Pinochet for all the crimes for which he was indicted by Judge Garz6n. But, relying on
Britain's implementation of the Convention Against Torture, a treaty to which both
Britain and Spain are parties, the House of Lords determined that Pinocher could be
extradited to Spain to stand trial for torture that had occurred in Chile.?
D. REGIONAL EVENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THEJUSTICE CASCADE
While the cases described above and a handful of other human rights cases were
proceeding through US courts, events in Latin America were not stagnant. The
unprecedented wave of repression and human rights abuses that inundated the region
in the 1970s and 1980s gave way by the early 1990s to the restoration of electoral
democracy and human rights improvements in a majority of countries in the region.
This transformation was interwoven with increased regional consensus and adherence
to international and regional instruments that codified states' obligations to protect
human rights and ensure democratic participation in government. Between 1976 and
1978 the most important international human rights treaties relevant to Latin
America-including the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human Rightsentered into force. Probably in response to pressure from the Carter administration
and the international bandwagon effect accompanying these treaties' entry into force,
a handful of Latin American countries ratified the major human rights instruments
between 1977 and 1981. But after 1985 ratifications surged. This can only be
explained by the occurrence of a genuine norms shift that rippled through the region.
Torture, disappearance, extrajudicial executions, and government violations of other
basic civil and political rights were no longer regarded as legitimate tactics of regimes
trying to preserve national security. Instead, they came to be viewed as crimes.
Argentina carried the idea of criminal responsibility the farthest when it tried
nine former junta members for human rights crimes during the 1976-83 dictatorship.
In Argentina, and elsewhere, this produced a clamor for amnesty or other forms of
immunity from prosecution from military personnel and others who were responsible

33. Under this rule, which is embedded in most international agreements addressing the subject of exr-adition,
a person cannot be extradited to stand trial for a crime that is not recognized by the state to which the
request for extradition is submitted.
34. R v Bow Street Metro Stipendiary Maitrateand Oth:rs, ex part PircdnoUgarte, 1 AC 147 (House of Lords
1999).
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for such past crimes and their supporters. In many cases these officers believed they
were shielded from prosecution by self-amnesty laws that they passed prior to leaving
power. In others, the question of amnesty did not arise until negotiations leading to
civilian rule. In both cases, military officers threatened to topple fragile new
democracies if protection from judicial sanctions was not ensured.
Throughout the region, amnesty laws impeded prosecutions, but did not squelch
demands for justice. To the contrary, these demands grew louder with the passage of
time and the consolidation of democracy throughout the region. Military threats to
undermine democracy unless individual officers were protected from prosecution had
the unintended consequence of contributing to a regional norms shift with respect to
electoral democracy. In most Latin American countries, a return to military rule was
politically unacceptable. Thus, while elected governments acquiesced to demands for
legal protections from prosecution for those responsible for past rights abuses,
governments, individually and collectively, focused on ways to shore up democracies
so that they would be able to resist threats to popular electoral sovereignty. At the
national level, many newly elected governments downsized military forces and rapidly
promoted unimplicated junior officers who saw their role as serving a democratically
elected regime; senior officers who participated in prior military regimes were retired.
At the international level, states cooperated through the OAS to adopt specific
norms promoting democracy. In 1991, the OAS General Assembly adopted a
resolution on democracy in the Americas called the Santiago Commitment to
Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System." The OAS General
Assembly also established a process for convening an ad hoc meeting of the region's
foreign ministers in the event of any sudden or irregular interruption of democratic
governance by a member state." The following year, members of the OAS
strengthened this regional commitment to democracy when they amended the OAS
Charter with the Protocol of Washington. That Protocol provides that two-thirds of
the OAS General Assembly may vote to suspend a member state whose
democratically elected government has been overthrown by force.' The Santiago
Declaration and the Protocol of Washington have provided the procedural basis for
many regional actions supporting democracy in Latin America during the 1990s.

35.
36.

37.

Resolution adopted at the Third Plenary Session (June 4, 1991), reprinted in Viron P. Vaky and Heraldo
Mufioz, The Futureof the Organizationof American States 103-106 (Twentieth Century 1993).
AG/RES 1080 (XXI-0/91), Representative Democracy, Resolution adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session
(June 5, 1991), reprinted in Vaky and Mufioz, The Future of the Organization of American States at 107-08
(cited in note 35).
I-E Rev OEA Documentos Officiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add 3 (SEPF), signed December 14, 1992, entered
into force September 25, 1997.
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E. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS PROPELLING A DEMAND FORJUSTICE

Internationally, events were changing as well. The Cold War ended and with it
the potential for proxy wars in Latin America and elsewhere diminished. Broader
international consensus in favor of liberal democracy was accompanied by a greater
international political willingness to allow institutions like the OAS and the United
Nations to achieve agreement on how to respond to new crises than had been possible
during the Cold War. In the case of Haiti, the United Nations Security Council
broke new ground when, at the behest of the United States, it approved Resolution
940 which called on member states to "use all necessary means to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leadership." This was the first time the Security
Council legitimized the use of force in defense of democracy.!
Haiti turned out to be the exception. Lacking an international military force or
the funds necessary to recruit state military forces to serve the interests of
international peace on behalf of the United Nations, the UN Security Council often
found itself searching for alternative measures, short of the use of troops, to intervene
to stop bloodshed or inhumanity. One such measure was the establishment of
criminal tribunals for the purpose of trying individuals responsible for such crimes.
In 1993, in response to widespread and systematic murder, rape, and "ethnic
cleansing" of civilians in Bosnia, the UN Security Council, acting under the peace
enforcement provisions of the UN Charter (Chapter VII), established the Ad Hoc
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 ("ICTY"). Eighteen months after the establishment of the
ICTY, the Security Council established a similar court to prosecute genocide and
other systematic, widespread violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda
("ICTR"). Although both tribunals got off to rocky starts, as of October 2000 the
ICTY was actively prosecuting 38 of 65 indictees accused of atrocities in connection
with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, had sentenced four, and acquitted one. The
ICTR had convicted eight and had forty-three others in detention. As judicial
institutions, the ICTY and ICTR are increasingly respected for their independence
and their decisions are setting international precedents concerning some of the most
important legal questions of our time. For example, in 1998 the first conviction by an
international tribunal of an individual charged with genocide occurred when the
ICTR found Jean-Paul Akayesu, the political leader in Rwanda's Taba commune,
guilty of genocide. The tribunal further held that rape and sexual violence constitute
genocide if committed with the specific intent to destroy a targeted group.
38. Robert A. Pastor, More and Less tban it Seened: T1:e Carter.Nunn.PotiRlMedration in Hairi 19o4, in Chester
A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds, Herdig Cats: MuftUarty Medti~ in a CQmnr!.
World 507-525 (US Inst of Peace 1999)
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The institutionalization of the two ad hoc tribunals reinvigorated international
interest in establishing a permanent international criminal court. After the
Nuremberg Trials, the newly formed United Nations took up the task of planning for
a permanent international criminal court to try war criminals and perpetrators of
human rights. But the Cold War, and its attendant stalemate at the United Nations,
disrupted serious efforts in this regard. Renewal of these efforts in the mid-1990s was
spearheaded by a coalition of actors including the lawyers who had worked on the
human rights litigation in US courts, NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Amnesty International, that had long
pushed for trials of perpetrators and other forms of accountability in the wake of gross
violations of human rights, and governments, particularly in Europe, that had
internalized the international justice ethic. Such a court would redress the chief
complaint concerning the two ad hoc tribunals-that they were arbitrary because they
were created in response to events in two countries, whereas no similar court was
available to prosecute those responsible for similar tragedies elsewhere.
In the summer of 1998, the United Nations sponsored an international
diplomatic conference in Rome to draft a statute for an International Criminal Court
("ICC"). In Rome a group of some sixty "like minded" countries and hundreds of
NGOs propelled the process and achieved consensus or compromise to achieve a
comprehensive 128-article statute. Several Latin American states, including
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were among the key players in
the "like minded" group; Argentina and Venezuela played particularly active roles.
A treaty enabling states to participate in the ICC is now open for signature; the
ICC will be created once sixty nations ratify it. The Rome Statute describes in
extensive detail every aspect of the ICC's operation and functioning, but further
refinement is ongoing. As of January 1, 2001, 139 countries had signed and twentyseven had ratified the treaty.
The Rome Statute is a major accomplishment that provides a workable starting
point for a court that could make a lasting difference. Objectively, its success will be
measured by the number of states that ratify the treaty and join the Assembly of
States Parties, the adequacy of funding provided to ensure that once it is established it
is a viable court, and by the degree to which, because it exists, those who hold power
and would abuse that power by committing terrible abuses of human rights, are
deterred by the knowledge that they will be held accountable law for their crimes in an
international court of law. Subjectively, it already is a success. The Rome Statute
underscored international commitment to the rationale for universal jurisdictionthat some crimes are crimes not only against the people and states in which they
occur, but against the international community as a whole. This, in turn, boosted the
confidence of national judiciaries to prosecute or respond favorably to other country's
requests to extradite persons accused of human rights crimes, no matter where those
crimes took place.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE US AND EUROPEAN CASES ON THE VICTIMS AND IN
THE COUNTRIES WHERE ABUSES OCCURRED

Turning now to the impact of the US and European cases on the victims and in

the countries where the human rights violations occurred, we examine two types of
impact: (1) direct impact on individuals; and (2) indirect impact altering societal or
institutional perceptions or practices. Direct impact fosters change in how actors who
care about or are involved with these issues feel and act. For senior political leaders it
is reflected in what policies they call for or promote. For military or police officials and
others involved in perpetrating past abuses, it is reflected in the level of contrition they
display, as well as their attitudes about future involvement in the political arena. For
human rights organizations it is measured in their sense of how much progress has
been made on the human rights front. For victims and their families, it is measured by
the degree to which they feel that justice has been served and the extent to which it
enables them to leave the past in the past and move forward with their lives.
Indirect impact occurs where foreign trials have an effect on political processes
and institutions in the country where the abuses occurred that in turn have
implications for perpetrators and victims of human rights abuses. These can be either
perceptual changes, which occur when non-governmental actors are emboldened to
seek political change as a result of an external judicial process, or actual changes in
institutional practice effected by governmental organs in response to external events.
In the United States, the transnational justice network lavyers dedicated
hundreds of hours of volunteer time to the civil lawsuits discussed above. They
received substantial support from all the leading international human rights
organizations. Their efforts led to US federal court judgments on behalf of the
plaintiffs. But other than having the defendants declared "enemies of all mankind," or
the equivalent, the plaintiffs received little direct benefit. Moreover, the impact on the
human rights situations in the countries where the abuses occurred was minor.
In Paraguay no court was willing to enforce the default judgment awarded in
Filartiga,thus the family was never compensated. A decade after the decision, Dolly
Filartiga told a newspaper reporter that 'little has changed in her native Paraguay...
[and that] she still dares not return for fear of reprisal because of her role in exposing
Joelito's murderer."3
Little changed in Paraguay during the years Pefia-Irala was in the United States.
Paraguay still endured the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner, who held
power from 1954 to 1989. Torture and prolonged arbitrary detention of opponents of
the regime were routine occurrences throughout the Stroessner years, and all efforts
to develop democratic institutions and civil society were stifled. In an interview, Dr.
39. Kenneth R. Clark, Murder in Paraguay: IBO Docudrama Tells FrustratigTale of Famils FRibt for Jute,
Chicago Tribune C15 (April 18,1991).
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Filartiga stated that his case made very little impact in Paraguay and did not lead to an
improvement in human rights there. "Here, nothing happened. They didn't even
know about [the Filartiga case]. They treated me as an anti-Paragua an. No
information on the case was published. Here it was all a dead-end street." Former
US Ambassador to Paraguay Robert White reported some nervousness at the highest
levels of the Paraguayan government after the decision was rendered: "'After the case
was decided in favor of Dr. Filartiga one of the people closest to General Stroessner
told me that I just had to do everything possible to get this decision reversed.... (N]o
Paraguayan government figure would feel free to travel to the United States if this
judgment was upheld because.., they would feel that they would be liable to arrest." "
But even if nervousness in fact inhibited the travel plans of key Paraguayan political
figures, it did not alter their behavior in Paraguay, nor did the lawsuit have any impact
on human rights policies or practices in the country. The Filartiga family got some
sense of justice when a foreign court pronounced Pefia-Irala liable, but this
satisfaction was overshadowed by the complete lack of response in Paraguay.42
Similarly in the lawsuit against Suarez-Mason, none of the plaintiffs collected
on their judgments. The plaintiffs in one of the lawsuits, Deborah Benchoam and
Alfredo Forti, are still attempting to collect on their judgments in Argentina, but so
far have been unsuccessful. Two of the Rapaport v Suarez-Mason plaintiffs, the
widowed mother and sole surviving sibling of a disappeared youth, reported that the
suit's most significant benefit was family reunification. Before the lawsuit, the elderly
mother was denied permission to travel to the United States to visit her exiled
daughter because US Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officials feared
that she would remain and become a burden on the United States. Only after the
district court judge ordered her appearance in connection with the case did INS relent
and grant her a visa.
But unlike Pefia-Irala, Suarez-Mason returned to a political climate in Argentina
that was fundamentally different from when he commanded the First Army Corps in
Buenos Aires. After the armed forces' humiliating defeat in the Falldands/Malvinas
War in 1982, and the restoration of democracy the following year, judicial
accountability for past human rights abuses became a national obsession. Revulsion at
the abuses perpetrated by the military on thousands of Argentine citizens during the
dirty war created sufficient political space for newly elected President Raul Alfonsin's
government to try nine former junta members in 1985; five were convicted and
sentenced to time in prison.
40.
41.

Interview with Dr. Joel Filartiga, Asunci6n, Paraguay, January 2, 1996 (on file with authors).
Richard P. Claude, The Case ofJoelito Filartigain the Courts 328,336, in Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H.

Weston, eds, Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action 336, 328-339 (Pennsylvania 2d ed
42.

1992).
Filartiga interview (cited in note 40).
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Among the leaders of Argentina's military dictatorship, Suarez-Mason was
among the most radically anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and anti-communist. In 1984,
before President Alfonsin had secured legislation to try his predecessors for human
rights abuses, a federal judge issued a warrant for Suarez-Mason's arrest in a case
involving the disappearance of a scientist in 1978. Suarez-Mason, who announced he
would not be a scapegoat, immediately left the country. No other Argentine military
officer fled Argentina rather than face trial and, for doing so, he was held in contempt
by his military comrades-in-arms. When he refused to appear before the court, they
stripped him of rank and expelled him from the Army. After human rights activists
discovered that he was living in the United States and filed civil lawsuits against him,
the government of Argentina requested his extradition to stand trial for hundreds of
human rights crimes. Extradition for thirty-nine murders was approved and he was
returned to Argentina where he immediately was arrested. Because of his military
seniority and the early date on which charges were brought against him, he was not
subject to either of two amnesty measures introduced in the latter years of the
Alfonsin administration to appease military officers who were hostile to continued
trials for rights abuses during the dirty war-the due obedience law and the Punto
Final. But criminal proceedings against him languished and in December 1990 he
benefited from the second of two pardons offered by President Menem to military
officers who remained indicted or convicted of human rights crimes during the
dictatorship.
Suarez-Mason's encounters with the Argentinejudicial system did not end with
his pardon. In December 1996 he was charged by an Argentine court with making an
anti-Semitic remark in violation of Argentine law and $1,500 of his assets were
frozen.' In December 1999 he was arrested again for human rights crimes, this time
for the theft of children of Argentina's "disappeared," suppression of their identities,
illegal custody and concealment." Meanwhile, in December 1997, Spanish judge
Baltasar Garz6n, the judge who indicted Pinochet, indicted Suarez-Mason for the
disappearance of Spanish citizens in Argentina. He also was convicted in absentia by
an Italian court for kidnapping and murdering eight Italian citizens during the dirty
war.

By publicizing Suarez-Masonfs whereabouts, the US civil litigation had the
direct impact of prodding the Argentine government into seeking his extradition and
continuing judicial proceedings against him in Argentina. But his case was
exceptional. Although the military opposed trials of military officers for their conduct
during the dictatorship, they did not oppose trying Suarez-Mason because of his
cowardice in fleeing the country, which they regarded as an act of dishonor. Yet, the
fact that by the time he was pardoned he had not yet been tried is evidence of political
43.

Ex Military Cbief Cbargedfor Antisernitic Comnients, Agence France Presse (Dee 4. 1996).

44. Marcela Valente, Rights-Argentina:Arrests ofMilitary Officers Continue, Inter Press Service (Dec 6,1999).
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ambivalence about trying him and how little indirect impact his case had on political
decision-making at the time.
For the Gramao plaintiffs, the process similarly has been frustrating and has
stirred up painful memories. They have not been compensated nor have they
experienced any sense that justice has been done. Their only satisfaction is knowing
that Gramajo was found liable by a US court.45 The lawsuit apparently has had an
impact on General Gramajo. In the early 1990s, Gramajo was particularly well
regarded in some US political circles; they saw him as a key mediator between the
Guatemalan military and the country's political sector. 4' A Washington Post article in
1992 claimed that many expected Gramajo to win the next presidential elections in
Guatemala in 1995. 4" But the tide turned quickly. A month before the court's decision
was handed down, then-US Congressman Robert Torricelli accused the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") of being implicated in human rights abuses in
Guatemala. A week before the court issued its decision, the Clinton administration
decided to cut off covert CIA aid to Guatemala, which had continued despite
Congress' 1990 decision to end military aid. In that week's edition of The Nation, US
journalist Allan Nairn specifically accused Gramajo of being one of the "CIA's men"
in Guatemala." Gramajo defended himself in a Guatemalan radio broadcast by
asserting that he worked "with the CIA" and not "for the CIA.4 9 On the heels of these
events the US court found that "plaintiffs have convincingly demonstrated that, at a
minimum, Gramajo was aware of and supported widespread acts of brutality
committed by personnel under his command resulting in thousands of civilian
deaths.... [and that he] refused to act to prevent such atrocities. "5°
After this confluence of bad publicity, Gramajo's cordial relations with
influential political groups in the United States were severed. Apparently in response
to the lawsuit, US military officers distanced themselves from him and the US
government withdrew his invitation to speak at a military conference in Miami."
Possibly due to this loss of external sponsorship, his political fortunes in Guatemala
also faded. He received a tiny fraction of the presidential vote in the 1995 elections
and since that time human rights activists in Guatemala and the United States have

45. Telephone interview with Alice Zachmann, December 22, 2000 (on file
with authors).
46. Human Rights Causes Row between the US and Guatemala, in Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico and
Central America Report (March 29, 1990).
47. Shelley Emling, Guatemala'sPossible FuturePresident, Wash Post (Foreign Journal) A13 (Jan 6,1992).
48. Allan Nairn, CIA Death Squads, The Nation 511-13 (April 16, 1995).
49. Fabiana Frayssinet, Guatemala: Gramajo Case Sheds Furtber Light on CIA Intervention, Inter Press Service
(April 18, 1995).
50. Xuncax v Gramajo,886 F Supp 162, 172-73 (D Mass 1995).
51. Colum Lynch, US backs awayfrom Guatemalageneral, Boston Globe 9 (April 15, 1995).
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lost sight of him. He plays no role in public life in Guatemala and nothing about him
appears in the news."
The impact of the European cases turned out to be more significant. The turning
point was Pinocbet. Although most of those indicted or charged with human rights
crimes have, until now, evaded punishment, momentum for such trials has built and
more and more cases are moving forward. The Argentine and Chilean cases before
Judge Garz6n, though initially brought on behalf of only a handful of victims, have
swelled to include hundreds, and international arrest warrants have been issued for
dozens of former junta members and military officers from those two countries.
In Italy, a criminal case against Suarez-Mason, Omar Santiago Riveros, and five
other Argentine military defendants for the murder of eight Argentines of Italian
descent including one infant went to trial after a sixteen-year investigation. On
December 6, 2000, after a fourteen month trial, the Court found all seven guilty.
Suarez-Mason and Riveros were sentenced, in absentia, to life imprisonment, the
remaining defendants were each sentenced, in absentia, to twenty-four years in
prison!'
Another Italian judicial proceeding occurred with respect to retired Argentine
Army Major Jorge Olivera. Olivera was arrested in August 2000 while in Rome with
his wife celebrating their silver wedding anniversary. His arrest was based on a French
warrant charging him with participation in the kidnapping, torture, and disappearance
of Marie Anne Erize Tisseau, a French citizen who lived in Argentina during the
dictatorship. Olivera's defense attorney produced Erize's death certificate, which
prompted the Italian court to conclude that the crimes with which he was charged
could not be tried in Italy. Consequently, Italy was barred from extraditing him to
France. Olivera was released and immediately returned to Argentina. Upon his return,
Argentina charged him with forging the documents that won his release.'
The impact of the European cases has even reached Latin America. In August
2000, Mexico arrested retired Argentine Navy Captain Miguel Cavallo as the plane on
which he traveled from Mexico City to Buenos Aires stopped to refuel in Cancfin. In
November 1999, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garz6n filed charges against Cavallo for
torturing ThelmaJara de Cabezas, a Spanish woman living in Buenos Aires in the late
1970s, and the murder of Monica Jurequi and Elba Delia Aldaya, two other
Spaniards. Judge Garz6n issued an international warrant for his arrest. Cavallo was in
Mexico because an Argentine company he heads had obtained a contract to operate
Mexico's newly privatized National Registry of Vehicles. The Mexican newspaper
Reforma received complaints from Mexican drivers about arcane vehicle registration
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requirements, and asked its correspondent in Buenos Aires to investigate. The
reporter uncovered Cavallo's past and the international warrant for his arrest, and
Reforma passed the information on to Mexican authorities. Cavallo is now in jail in
Mexico awaiting the outcome of Spain's request for his extradition."
V. NATIONAL RESPONSES IN LATIN AMERICA TO INTERNATIONAL EVENTS
PROPELLING THE JUSTICE CASCADE

In Chile, the arrest of Pinochet appears to have lifted psychological, political, and
juridical barriers to justice by weakening the powerful forces blocking such trials in
Chile since the return to democracy. International pressures bolstered by routine
retirement and replacement in the Chilean judiciary and military have yielded a more
liberal judiciary and a younger, less implicated military officer corps. The longer
Pinochet's detention in Britain continued, and the more legal decisions that
accumulated justifying his arrest, the more significant the domestic impact appeared
to be. While political and military leaders, and human rights organizations and
victims, disagreed about whether Pinochet should be tried at all, most agreed that if he
was tried the trial should take place in Chile. This consensus was founded on both
ideological and practical concerns. Although temporarily weakened during the
dictatorship, Chileans have a long tradition of pride in their judicial system, which has
a reputation for impartiality, fairness, and effective administration ofjustice. They also
have a high level of national pride and confidence in their capacity to solve domestic
problems without external interference. In addition, Chileans agreed that the fairest
trial would occur where all the witnesses and evidence were located, and where people
of Chile, of all political persuasions, could closely observe the proceedings.
Since Pinochet's arrest, twenty-five Chilean officers have been arrested on
charges of murder, torture, and kidnapping. In an interview, Defense Minister
Edmundo Perez Yoma discussed a "new attitude" emerging among the military high
command: "You deal with it or it will never go away. You have to confront it-that's
the changed attitude."" In July 1999, Chile's Supreme Court upheld a lower court
decision that the amnesty law was no longer applicable to cases in which people had
disappeared. Until the bodies of the victims were located, the crime was not murder
but kidnapping, meaning the crime was a continuing event beyond the 1978 amnesty
deadline.
When British authorities allowed Pinochet to return to Chile after determining
that his ill health prevented him from standing trial, many feared that these legal
advances in Chile would be reversed. But, despite a hero's welcome, and his surprising
vigor on the Santiago tarmac, New York Times reporter Clifford Krause's description
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of Pinochet as "a real nowhere man" most accurately reflects his current position. His
return sped up negotiations between military and civilian officials on a human rights
accord that created a mechanism to uncover what happened to approdmately 1,200
people who disappeared during Pinochets dictatorship. On June 5, 2000, a Santiago
appeals court ruled, by a vote of thirteen to nine, that Pinochet could be stripped of
his lifetime immunity from prosecution and could be tried for the disappearance of at
least nineteen people in October 1973. Two months later, the Chilean Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's ruling. In December 2000, Pinochet's case was once
more in the news: a Chilean prosecuting judge ordered Pinochet to stand trial for
human rights crimes.
The European cases against the Argentine military officers had the
unanticipated effect of spurring change in Argentina's willingness to try human rights
cases. The decision by the Argentine government to imprison Admiral Massera and
General Videla pending trial apparently was a preemptive measure in response to the
Spanish judge's international arrest warrants.! Argentina has even extended its
judicial reach transnationally; albeit in a case in which the events took place in
Argentina. In November 2000, a former Chilean secret police agent was sentenced to
life in prison in Argentina for his role in the assassination of former Chilean General
Carlos Prats and his wife, Sofia Cuthbert. Prats was Chile's Army Commander in
Chief during the administration of Salvador Allende and fled to Argentina when
Allende was overthrown. Prats and his wife were killed in a car bomb in Buenos Aires
on September 30, 1974. The Argentine court has formally requested the extradition
of Pinochet to stand trial in Argentina for his role in the Prats murder. The firstjudge
to receive the extradition request in Chile recused himself citing "pressure from the
right."9 A new judge was appointed and is considering arguments concerning
Argentinas request.'
The Spanish court cases have raised the hopes of human rights activists
throughout Latin America that justice for rights abuses in their countries is possible.
Following the lead of Argentine and Chilean human rights activists, Guatemalan
Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu filed a case in the Spanish court against
three former Guatemalan presidents and military leaders, Romeo Lucas Garcia, Oscar
Mejia Victors, and Efrain Rios Montt, currently president of the Chamber of
Deputies, and five lower ranking officials, for murders and other crimes that she
asserts amount to genocide against Guatemala's indigenous Mayan population.
Lawyers for the defendants have counterattacked by filing a suit against Menchu in
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Guatemalan courts charging her with treason, sedition, and violation of the
constitution for filing charges in a foreign court. In December 2000, the Spanish court
dropped the indictments saying the case should be brought before the courts in
Guatemala, but left open the possibility that the Spanish courts could provide
jurisdiction if the political pressure or legal restrictions impede the case from going
forward there. Guatemala never had a blanket amnesty law as did Chile and Uruguay,
nor a statute of limitations for human rights violations that effectively served as an
amnesty as did Argentina. Thus numerous human rights cases have moved forward in
Guatemalan courts, but because these cases are plagued by death threats and
intimidation of witnesses, political interference, and scores of procedural flaws, few
have led to convictions.
Meanwhile, Pinochet and the efforts of Menchu to bring former Guatemalan
dictators to account in Spain have contributed to an aura of contrition among
Guatemala's senior policymakers. In August 2000, Guatemalan President Alfonso
Portillo admitted government responsibility for atrocities committed during the
country's thirty-six-year civil war and pledged to investigate massacres, prosecute
those responsible, and compensate the victims. Moreover, in a show of good faith,
President Portillo signed an agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission ("IACHR") that affirms Guatemala's institutional responsibility for war
crimes and empowers the IACHR to monitor the actions of the Guatemalan
government in light of its new promises to redress those past wrongs.6 In December
2000, the Inter-American Court found that the Guatemalan government had killed
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a rebel leader, and the husband of human rights activist
Jennifer Harbury. It is still too soon to know the impact of the Inter-American
Court's decision on domestic legal processes in Guatemala.
Elsewhere on the continent, hopes are rising that more trials of high-ranking
officials accused of human rights abuses will occur. In June 2000, Congressman
Marcos Rolim, who heads the Human Rights Commission in Brazil's Chamber of
Deputies, asked President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to strip former Paraguayan
dictator Alfredo Stroessner of his political asylum. Once it is lifted he plans to ask
Brazilian prosecutors to charge the former dictator with human rights violations
during his nearly thirty-five-year rule in neighboring Paraguay. Congressman Rolim
agreed that his trial in Paraguay would be preferable but argued that in light of the
recent failed military coup and the continuing ties many current political actors in
Paraguay still have to Stroessner, a trial in Paraguay could generate further political
unrest. In his view, "Brazil, by giving asylum and protection to Stroessner, has
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responsibility for his destiny"' In December 2000, a Paraguayan court requested
Stroessner's extradition from Brazil to stand trial for the 1977 disappearance of

Paraguayan physician Agustin Goiburu, who was living in exile in Argentina when he
disappeared in 1977.

In Haiti, democratically elected President Aristides return was accompanied by
a clamor for justice encouraged by Aristide and his successor, President Rene Preval.
In November 2000, a court tried fifty-eight former military leaders and other lesser

players in the 1991 coup that drove President Aristide from power. The case focused
on the April 1994 massacre at the Raboteau shanty town in the coastal city of
Gonaives in which approximately a dozen people were murdered and thrown into the
sea, and many other residents were beaten or had their houses burned. For Haitians,
although the trial focused on one human rights criminal event, it was symbolic of all
the human rights crimes that occurred during the three-year Cedras regime. In the
first phase of the trial, sixteen former soldiers and their henchmen who were arrested
in Haiti were convicted; six others were acquitted. The convicted soldiers were
sentenced to life imprisonment, the others received sentences between four and nine
years. In the second phase, thirty-seven senior military officials, including former coup
leader Raoul Cedras who in return for giving up power received a comfortable exile in
Panama, were convicted of premeditated voluntary homicide and sentenced in
absentia to life imprisonment.
Latin American countries also have enthusiastically supported efforts to establish
the ICC. As of December 2000, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay had
signed the ICC treaty and were taking steps towards ratification. Three countries,
Belize, Venezuela, and Uruguay, had ratified it. The Latin American embrace of an
international court to try perpetrators of human rights is closely linked with the
region's determination to promote and protect democracy, and countries recognition
that the rule of law and an effective independent judiciary are crucial elements of any
functioning democracy. Contrary to Moravcsikls liberal republican theory, both old
and new democracies in the region have moved quickly to sign and ratify the treaty.
The Rome Statute gives preeminence to national judiciaries and state sovereignty by
limiting the ICCs jurisdiction to situations where a state that has jurisdiction is
unable or unwilling to investigate the matter, or to prosecute it if the outcome of an
investigation determines prosecution is appropriate. 3 Thus in supporting the
establishment of an international criminal court, Latin American democracies feel no
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threat to their sovereignty because criminal cases over which their national tribunals
have jurisdiction will not end up before a world court.
VI. A CAUTIONARY TALE
Through the process of "borrowing" foreign judicial systems to seek justice for
past human rights abuses, the justice network and human rights victims have had to
face the limits of the process they have sought so fervently. The "successful" US civil
cases, that produced little more than symbolic benefit for the plaintiffs, were prescient
shadows of what could occur.
In November 2000, jurors in a federal court in Miami, Florida absolved two El
Salvadoran generals, Jos6 Guillermo Garcia, who was El Salvador's Minister of
Defense, and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, former director of El Salvador's
National Guard, of civil liability for the abduction, rape and murder of four American
churchwomen by National Guardsmen in 1980. Five enlisted National Guardsmen
were convicted in El Salvador in 1984 of the crimes and were sentenced to thirty-years
imprisonment. During their criminal trials, they asserted that they had acted on
superior orders.
After listening to many days of testimony concerning the violence, chaos, and
gross violations of human rights during El Salvador's twelve-year civil war, the jury
concluded that the situation was so chaotic and command so decentralized that the
generals lacked sufficient command over and control of their troops to be responsible
for their conduct. The verdict, which was rendered after only eleven hours of
deliberation, dismayed family members of the four churchwomen who had presented
days of testimony about human rights abuses during the civil war that claimed 75,000
lives.
Trial observers asserted that the trial was closely watched by military officers in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and elsewhere who were concerned that although they
received amnesties they could yet be prosecuted." During the trial, prosecutors in El
Salvador sought to reopen the case of six Jesuits who were slain, along with their
housekeeper and her daughter, in 1989. They were rebuffed by a Salvadoran court
which ruled that the prosecutor's request was "without legal substance."" It bears
noting that neither El Salvador nor Guatemala have yet signed the ICC treaty.
The lesson of the El Salvador case is that even the fairest trial does not always
result in the outcome the transnational justice network seeks. Courts can achieve
justice only to the extent the evidence to secure a conviction or civil finding of liability
is available. Unfortunately, in human rights cases the evidence needed to support a
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judgment in a court of law often is controlled by those involved in human rights
abuses who have reason to destroy it or otherwise ensure that it is never produced for
use against them. Sovereignty concerns also may play a role. Thus, even if a
government is willing to investigate, prosecute, or allow human rights trials to proceed
in its courts, it may be unwilling to cooperate with a foreign court to accomplish the
same purpose. Evidence also may be diluted by non-political factors such as the
passage of time, the death of key witnesses, insufficient resources, or even immigration
decisions that restrict the ability of parties to be present to press their claims in foreign
courts.
Moreover, judicial systems are human institutions; individual attitudes and
biases can insinuate themselves into even the fairest of processes. In the Salvadoran
generals' case, jurors interviewed after the conclusion of deliberations said that
notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary presented by the human rights NGOs
representing the plaintiffs, they were persuaded that the generals had done what they
could to curb abuses given the tumult of the era and a lack of resources to conduct
effective investigations or to discipline their troops.65
VII. CONCLUSION

We have argued that ajustice cascade is underway in Latin America today. This
norms cascade was the result of the concerted efforts of a transnational justice
advocacy network, made up of connected groups of activist lawyers with expertise in
international and domestic human rights law. The justice cascade, in turn, is part of a
larger human rights norms cascade in Latin America, and its success is very much
connected to the larger progress of human rights and democracy norms and practices
in the region. This explanation primarily reflects an ideational theory of international
relations, that stresses the effects of ideas and norms on social life. We do not expect
ideas, in and of themselves, to have a compliance pull. Rather, we argue that ideas are
influential because of the actions, pressures, and sanctions of state and non-state
actors aimed at promoting human rights norms. Aspects of both 'liberal" and "realist"
approaches are also relevant to understanding the justice cascade. Some of the most
enthusiastic supporters of the justice cascade in Latin America have been newly
democratizing states that are concerned about the stability of their new democracies.
The position of the hegemonic US government at times plays an important role in
supporting the justice cascade. Backtracking on human rights by the new US
administration would, without doubt, slow down or even temporarily stall its
progress. But, contrary to realist thought, lack of support from the hegemon will not
decisively block thejustice cascade, as the progress on the ICC Statute's ratification in
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the region suggests. A full explanation of the justice cascade must include attention to
the power of the principled ideas that undergird it, and the activism of states and
NGOs that support and sustain it.
Although we do not yet know the full scope and extent of the justice cascade in
Latin America, there is no doubt that a significant norms transformation has
occurred, and that the process is ongoing. Twenty years ago trials of human rights
perpetrators in foreign courts had little domestic impact on either individuals or
policy. The victims got little more than the nominal benefit of having a judge-albeit
a foreign judge in a foreign court-declare that the person they blamed for their
suffering was indeed legally responsible. Today the domestic response to extranational trials and international efforts to establish an international criminal court is
transforming the behavior of political leaders and military and police officers,
heightening victims' and victims' family members' sense that justice is being served,
and even changing the agendas of human rights organizations. Because of positive
governmental responsiveness, many human rights NGOs in Argentina, Chile, and
other Latin American countries are able to turn their attention to human rights issues
other than the quest for justice for past human rights abuses. In some countries, policy
and institutional changes have occurred in all branches of government, from courts,
which have found ways to obtain jurisdiction over perpetrators of past abuses, to
legislatures and executive branches of government. The latter have legislated or
decreed human rights polices aimed at redressing past abuses, or have stood aside
when their national judiciaries have moved ahead with judicial proceedings against
past perpetrators.
The certainty that these events constitute a justice cascade and not merely
opportunistic reaction to isolated external events is reinforced by the pervasive change
in values in the region. Certainty also is evident in the willingness of governments to
act to ensure its continuation, such as taking steps to prosecute past perpetrators
when there was no immediate likelihood of their trial in a foreign court, as Haiti did,
or signing an agreement with the IACHR to monitor compliance with promises to
prosecute and redress past abuses, as President Portillo of Guatemala did. Thus the
move towards justice is driven as much by policymakers' changing principles as by
their pragmatic concerns, as the ideational approach would suggest. But pragmatic
concerns are not absent here. The transnational justice network has used a
"boomerang' dynamic similar to that used by other transnational advocacy networks.
Domestic human rights groups have cooperated with international groups of lawyers
to bring pressure from outside to bear on their governments and their courts. Where
they have succeeded, it probably is a blend of principle and pragmatism that leads
governments and militaries to conclude that if they are going to face trials, it is
preferable to face them in their own country than abroad.
The consequences of this justice cascade are far reaching. With respect to the
perpetrators, even if they never face punishment, or even trial, they are finding
themselves "landlocked." Even where their own government is willing to protect them
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from the reach of foreign courts, they dare not travel abroad for fear that the country
they travel to will extradite them to a country seeking to try them. This pressure is felt
not only by those who know they are under indictment, but those who have reason to
fear they might be indicted abroad.
The much bigger casualty seems to be the amnesty decrees that past Latin
American dictators gave themselves before leaving office, or post-dictatorship
democratic regimes gave their predecessors in exchange for their allowing democracy
to flourish by not seizing power again. Old amnesties are not bearing up well against
current national sovereignty concerns. Latin America's democracies care deeply about
their international reputations and seem prepared to sacrifice former perpetrators'
immunity if the alternative is an infringement of sovereignty resulting from having
their former political leaders tried in a foreign court. No Latin American country,
particularly those with rapidly consolidating democracies, wants to foster the
perception that its courts lack the competence, capacity, or independence necessary to
effectively try its own nationals. Moreover this view is shared not only by elected
governmental officials, but by the armed forces that previously had insisted on
amnesties, and by the non-governmental human rights organizations that consistently
has demanded trials.
Still, there is plenty of evidence that in Latin America the justice cascade is far

from complete. In countries that have not yet faced the possibility that foreign
judiciaries will try their nationals, policy-makers have had far less enthusiasm for trials
even though they find the Pinocbet precedent worrisome. Thus Uruguay has taken
steps to restrict the foreign travel of its nationals who were implicated in past abuses
of human rights, while at the same time stepping up other initiatives, such as the
establishment of a national commission to investigate the disappearances of
Uruguayan nationals during the period when Uruguay and its neighbors all lived
under military regimes. Even in countries where internalization of the justice cascade
is more advanced, it is far from fiUlly realized. Thus in Argentina, where there has been
substantial progress with respect to conducting trials, there is far less movement when
it comes to executing judgments for civil damages in human rights trials that occurred
abroad. The inability of most plaintiffs to collect damages on their judgments suggests
that the application of the rule of law to achieve justice for victims in non-criminal
cases has not yet been swept up by the justice cascade.
We conclude that in Latin America, while the justice cascade is in progress, the
extent of its realization in each country depends on numerous factors including: (1)
the degree of consolidation of that country's democracy and legal system, (2) whether
that country has directly faced the possibility that one of its former senior political
figures would be tried abroad, (3) the amount of publicity and support foreign judicial
processes have received, (4) the intensity of the determination of domestic human
rights advocates and victims, amply supported by their international counterparts, to
pressure their government to realize justice for past wrongs, (5) the degree to which
each country feels it will bear some embarrassment or other international consequence
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for not conducting trials that is not outweighed by domestic political pressures exerted
by the supporters of those it would try, and (6) the extent to which those now in
power have internalized the justice norm and believe that trying past perpetrators is
the right thing to do.
The consequences of the justice cascade, including its manifestation in Latin
America, reach far beyond the region. Earlier we noted some of the efforts being taken
by European states to bring to justice those from other countries responsible for
egregious past violations of human rights. But the norms cascade is beginning to
penetrate non-European regions as well. In February 2000, a group of Chadian rights
activists and victims convinced a Senegalese court to indict former Chadian dictator
Hissene Habre and four collaborators. Habre has lived in luxurious exile in Senegal
since 1990, and Senegal was the first country to ratify the ICC treaty. Political events
in Senegal have subsequently waylayed the process. In April, Senegars new president,
Abdoulaye Wade, appointed Habre's main attorney as his special legal adviser, and, in
June, President Wade abruptly removed the judge who had indicted Habre from the
case. In July a new judge found that Senegal did not have jurisdiction for the torture
charges brought against Habre and dismissed the case. Meanwhile human rights
activists in Chad, invigorated by the possibility that Habre might be prosecuted, filed
suit in Chadian courts against their torturers. Chadian President Deby, sensitive to
the international exposure his country is receiving as a result of Habre's indictment in
Senegal, and to the heightened efforts of domestic human rights advocates to achieve
redress for past crimes, met for the first time with human rights victims and told them
that "the time for justice has come." President Deby promised them he would fire all
former officials still serving in government who were involved in past abuses. He also
promised that he would reopen the files of an investigatory commission that
documented some 4000 killings and other human rights crimes during the Habre
regime. The Commission's findings had been locked away by the Deby government
and until now ignored.
While we cannot predict how widespread the justice cascade will be or how
deeply it will penetrate, we can suggest some benchmarks that will help observers
measure the depth of that penetration. Objective indicators include: (1) the number of
trials held in countries where human rights abuses took place, (2) legislative changes in
those countries that allow trials where none were permitted before, and (3)judicial
decisions by domestic courts and perhaps by international bodies such as the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, that certain crimes are not included in amnesties.
Subjective indicators include: (1) the career trajectories of individuals accused of
human rights abuses, (2) the level of satisfaction of human rights victims involved in
both foreign and domestic lawsuits or who were victims of or witnesses in criminal
trials of human rights perpetrators, and (3) policy changes (and even political
conversations about policy changes) relating to the prosecution of those responsible
for human rights abuses in countries that have not yet been impacted by the
possibility of a foreign human rights trial of one of their nationals. Studying these
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indicators over time will enable researchers to more fully evaluate the domestic impact
of foreign human rights trials.
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